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Barring Asylum Claims: The President Versus the Statute
By Peter Margulies  Friday, November 9, 2018, 1:21 PM
President Trump has released a proclamation ordering that the United States will only consider asylum applications at recognized ports of entry along the U.S-Mexico
border. Together with the interim  nal rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ), the proclamation clashes with the
plain language, structure and plan that Congress outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While the Supreme Court rejected statutory arguments
against Trump’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, the statutory case against the new asylum proclamation is more pointed. Indeed, Congress anticipated the problem of
border in ows noted in the proclamation and enacted detailed procedures that preempt the  eld.
First, some background: The new proclamation cites increased migration of Central Americans to the United States through Mexico. The interim  nal rule, which DHS
and DOJ issued without prior notice and comment from interested stakeholders, bars foreign nationals crossing between designated ports of entry on the U.S.
southern border from seeking asylum. It allows those persons to seek only remedies that are far more dif cult to obtain, such as withholding of removal and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Foreign nationals (referred to as “aliens” under the INA) arriving between designated entry points who wish to seek
asylum because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution will thus have to return to Mexico and endure additional risk traveling to a designated location. If they do not
wish to shoulder this risk, they will have to meet a materially more demanding standard of proof to prevail in withholding or CAT cases. For support, the new
proclamation relies on 8 U.S.C. 1182(f)—the same provision that the government cited to support the travel ban—which authorizes the president to bar the entry of
“any alien or class of aliens” whose entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”
The new policy clashes with the INA’s plain meaning. For almost 40 years, Congress has clearly stated that a foreign national who presents herself anywhere on the
U.S. border or at a port of entry such as a harbor or airport has a right to claim asylum. In language codi ed as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress authorized
asylum claims by any foreign national “physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry” (emphasis added). Congress changed this text in
1996, but expressly reaf rmed in 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1) the eligibility for asylum of “any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival)" (emphasis added). This inclusive provision surely re ected Congress’s appreciation of facts on the ground:
refugees often  ee for their lives and cannot pick and choose at leisure the precise location at which they will seek relief. Given that exigency, allowing an applicant
for refugee status to assert a claim for asylum at any point along a land border is a necessary component of essential refugee protections.
Since 1980, it has been Congress’s goal to assemble those necessary components into a coherent structure. Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which  rst
mandated inclusive asylum procedures for all arriving foreign nationals, to “provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission … of refugees.” That
comprehensive approach replaced a patchwork of provisions for refugees that had been in place for the entire post-World War II era. Inclusive eligibility procedures
for asylum were a key part of this plan.
As the Supreme Court explained in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987), Congress sought to provide greater protection for refugees by carefully distinguishing between
asylum and the complementary remedy of withholding of removal, which entails a substantially higher standard of proof. To obtain withholding, an applicant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that she would be subject to persecution upon return to her country of origin. A preponderance standard requires proof that
it is more probable than not that an applicant would be subject to persecution. Today, applicants receive withholding only if they fail to qualify for asylum on grounds
unrelated to their fear of persecution, such as prior criminal conduct. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the government argued that the preponderance standard applied to both
asylum and withholding. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court found that Congress deliberately drafted the Refugee Act to allow asylum claims predicated
merely on a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.
According to the justices, Congress viewed the preponderance standard sought by the government as  atly inconsistent with the asylum de nition in the 1980 statute.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court looked to the provisions of the U.N. Refugee Protocol, which the U.S. rati ed in 1967, and the U.N. Convention on
Refugees, which the protocol incorporates by reference. As the Conference Report on the 1980 Act noted, the language in the Refugee Act was “based directly” on the
Protocol’s language and “is intended … [to] be construed consistent with the Protocol.” In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court found that “[t]here is simply no room
in the United Nations’ de nition [of asylum] for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted… he or
she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of the event happening.” According to the Supreme Court, Congress clearly believed that a standard higher than 10% was unduly
onerous. Particularly since a refugee must often leave a place of danger hurriedly and must then reconstruct past events thousands of miles away to gain asylum, a
rigid insistence on a preponderance standard would provide inadequate protection. An asylum applicant, unlike an applicant for withholding, need not jump through
the hoop of proving that an event is more probable than not to demonstrate a reasonable, objective fear of persecution within Congress’s de nition. Withholding of
removal is a fallback, but it is only that; Congress saw asylum as the principal avenue for refugee relief.
While the proclamation and accompanying DHS interim  nal rule cite increased migration from Central America as a reason to depart from Congress’s scheme,
Congress has already legislated comprehensively to address the pressures of in ow at the southern border. In 1996, as part of a massive overhaul of immigration,
Congress enacted what it called “expedited removal” provisions—now codi ed in 8 U.S.C. 1225—which authorized summary deportation, without a full immigration
court hearing, of certain foreign nationals apprehended at or near a land border. While these truncated expedited removal processes have triggered criticism from
refugee advocates, it included a carve-out for asylum-seekers that tracked verbatim the asylum provisions described above. Under the 1996 legislation, a foreign
national could assert an asylum claim as long as that individual was physically present in the United States or had arrived at any point of entry, whether or not the
government had of cially “designated” that location. For any such individual, an asylum of cer would determine if the claimant had a “credible fear” of persecution,
which the 1996 act de ned as a “signi cant possibility” of prevailing in any asylum claim—a standard materially lower than the preponderance standard that governs
withholding of removal and CAT relief. Under the 1996 summary procedure, a claimant who met the “signi cant possibility” standard would end up in full adversarial
proceedings in immigration court.
The new proclamation and DHS  nal interim rule would disrupt Congress’s plan by requiring Central Americans between designated entry points to jump through the
hoop of qualifying for withholding of removal. Many will not be able to hurdle that barrier, which the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca held was inconsistent with
comprehensive protections established by Congress. Put bluntly, substituting withholding for asylum will result in turning away applicants with a fear of torture,
death or other persecution that Congress de ned as well-founded and objectively reasonable. Responding to this humanitarian concern, the DHS  nal rule comments
breezily that those affected are not at risk of persecution or torture in Mexico, whatever their fate in their countries of origin. However, that unsupported conclusion
ignores the peril that asylum-seekers face from smugglers and other lawless groups operating in Mexico. If, as the  nal rule concedes, increased arrivals at designated
entry points will create delays, those delays will spell peril for asylum-seekers. Congress appreciated in 1980 and 1996 that such peril was too much to bear. That is
why Congress expressly made arriving foreign nationals eligible to seek asylum anywhere on U.S. land borders.
While the Supreme Court granted the president wide leeway under § 1182(f) of the INA in Trump v. Hawaii, the court based that  exibility on analysis of the statutory
scheme. There is no such argument available to the administration here: The asylum framework that Congress enacted in 1980 and af rmed in material part in 1996
unambiguously clashes with the new proclamation’s prescriptions. Perhaps the administration is correct that increased migration from Central America requires
further modi cations in asylum procedure. But it should address that argument to Congress instead of acting unilaterally to dismantle express protections in the INA.
Topics: Immigration
Tags: Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration, immigration reform, migration, Donald Trump, President Trump, Refugee
Peter Margulies is a professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, where he teaches Immigration Law, National Security Law and
Professional Responsibility. He is the author of Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration (New York: NYU Press, 2010).
